sayings of the Prophet and the Shi i Imams. Yet while the centrality of the Qur'an to Sadra's mystical philosophy can hardly be denied, the influence of the Imams' teachings on his thought is a harder case to make. The Imams are mentioned somewhat rarely, relative to other important thinkers dealt with in Sadra's philosophical works. Even in Sadra's many works of Q uranic commentary, the teachings o f the Imams are invoked much less than one might expect.2 When he does cite the traditions of the Imams, it is often as part of a concluding section to a metaphysical discussion in which he provides a set of transmitted or scriptural (samft) proof texts to support his philosophical point.3 Even in such cases, however, Sadra does not necessarily privilege Shi i traditions over Sunni ones; and at times, this gives the impression that the Imams' teachings have been mentioned as a matter of expected formality, almost as an addendum to a philosophical point. Yet, near the end of his life, Sadra wrote his lengthy commentary on Kulayni's canonical collection of Imami Shfa traditions. The devotion of time and effort to such an endeavor seems to indicate a reverence for the traditions of the Imams as a rich source of spiritual and religious knowledge. But if this is the case, then why do these traditions, unlike the Qur'an and the works of other Islamic thinkers, have relatively little place in his philosophical works?
Perhaps more problematic, however, is the degree to which Sadra's gradated and fluid ontology and epistemology implicitly contradict Twelver Shi i hadlth narrations on the status of the Imams. For Twelver Shfa, the Imams occupy an ontological category all their own; one that exists below that of the prophets, but transcends that of ordinary human beings. This hierarchy is clearly articulated in Shi i hadlth literature, which also represents this spiritual hierarchy as fixed from pre-temporal times. In Shi i hadlth literature, the Imam's biological connection to the Prophet was mythologized to mean that he was created from pure Muhammadan light (nur Muhammadl),4 or in an alternative formulation, from a pure clay, superior to that from which other human beings were crafted.5 Thus, no matter how pious, learned, or spiritually pure an individual might be, he could never ascend to the level of the Imams. Even if many Shi i scholars have rejected some of these mythological traditions as exaggerations, at least with regard to their literal meaning, the doctrine of the unique and superior knowledge of the Imam has continued to fund Shi i conceptions of their own unique claim to religious knowledge as the community of their followers. Imami hadlth literature indicates that the Imams surpassed all others in knowledge, even, perhaps, the pre-Muhammadan prophets. For just as the Prophet had inherited the knowledge of all previous prophets, the Imams were believed to have inherited the knowledge of the Prophet Muhammad, and thus the knowledge of all pre-Islamic prophets as well.6 Moreover, the Imams were considered to be in sole possession of the true interpretation of the Qur'an, as recorded by cAli b. Abi Talib from the Prophet himself, and as passed down from Imam to Imam. Beyond this, the Imams were said to receive a form of divine knowledge and inspiration on a continuous basis.7
These traditions about the superior knowledge of the Imams, many of which crossed the line into obvious exaggeration (ghuluww), nonetheless made it clear that the epistemological stature of the Imams was as eternally unreachable as their ontological status. Even if we were to put aside the more exaggerated claims of the Shfi hadlth literature, the epistemological superiority of the Imams is sufficiently established in the Imami doctrine of the Imams' inerrancy ( isma) in matters of religious knowledge, a quality otherwise attributed only to the prophets. The hierarchical categories of knowledge in Shfi thought continued below the level of the Imam, with those scholars well-versed in the teachings o f the Imams holding the highest status, followed by other devoted Shfis, non-Shfi Muslims, and everyone else. Moreover, Shii tradition developed these hierarchical categories of knowledge in the context of an early Shii electionist perspective-well-attested in the Shi i hadlth literature-according to which one's status as a Shii or a non-Shfi was considered to have been determined by God, or at least to have been established from pre-temporal times, indicating the futility of changing one's status in this life.8 Mulla Sadra's ontology and epistemology is also clearly hier archical in nature, but it differs from the Imami Shi i perspective, particularly as found in canonical books o f Shi i hadlth, in two fundamental and interrelated ways. First, the establishment of a hierarchy among men takes place in the course of earthly life, not prior to it. From Sadra's point of view, all human beings begin in the same place, originated in the common human mold, or fitra, and as a single "species," and are only differentiated ontologically and epistemologically through their actions and acquired knowledge in earthly life. They undergo a second "origination" after death, whereby the inner hierarchy of spiritual states acquired in this life becomes a manifest hierarchy of corresponding psychic bodies of different species.9 Second, Sadra's conception of a human epistemological and ontological hierarchy is predicated upon the gradated and constantly changing nature of both existence (wujud) and spiritual knowledge, allowing for innumerable ontological levels;10 and unlike traditional Shfi conceptions of spiritual hierarchy as static and fixed, Sadras system assumes the possibility of a fluid and continuous movement from lower to higher states. Given the questions discussed above, Sadras commentary on the earliest and most comprehensive canonical collection of Shfi hadith, Kulayni's Usul al-kafl, would seem an obvious place to look for answers. While this commentary is not complete in its extant form, what does remain offers a window onto the way in which Sadra attempted to understand his lifelong religious affiliation with the Shi i school and his devotion to the Imams in the context of his now fully developed philosophical perspective. Sadras com mentary on the first chapter of Kulayni's collection, entitled Kitab alJ aql wa-l-jahl (The book o f intellect and ignorance), contains an extensive philosophical and mystical discussion of the intellect which, of course, is foundational to his own metaphysics, as well as to that of his philosophical predecessors, and, some would argue, to the spiritual worldview of Twelver Shfism as a whole.11
In this article, however, I have chosen to focus on Sadras com mentary on Kulayni's chapter on the Kitab fa d l alJ ilm (Superiority of knowledge). Sadras commentary on this section is complete, in that he treats every hadith found in Kulayni's chapter, and it com prises nearly 400 pages of the extant Sharh. Sadras commentary on this chapter is particularly relevant because, for Sadra, knowledge represents the purpose and ultimate end of all human creation; it is the source and the consequence of all worthwhile human endeavor and virtue, and it alone saves. Thus Kulayni's chapter offers Sadra a platform from which he can address some of the epistemological issues he wrestles with in his philosophical works, as they relate to the teachings of the Shfi Imams. Moreover, because the chapter is concerned with "knowledge" in general, rather than with the more abstract, philosophical concept of the intellect Qaql), it provides Sadra an opportunity to comment on some of the more mundane aspects of the role of knowledge in Islamic social life, and to offer, at times, stinging criticism of the ways in which religious knowledge was defined, measured, valued and peddled in the Safavid Sh fi society of his time.
In what follows, I begin with an overview of the key aspects of Sadra's philosophy of knowledge as they are represented in this commentary, including the ontological and eschatological function of knowledge in Sadra's thought. From there, I discuss the implications of this theory of knowledge for the recognition of an ontological and epistemological hierarchy among human beings-a "hierarchy of knowers." In this second section I begin with an examination of Sadra's views on various approaches to religious knowledge and his criticism of the common understanding and assessment of religious knowledge among the scholars of his own time. His criticism of these scholars is well embedded in his commentary on this chapter, and they serve as an important foil for his own philosophical claims about the significance of knowledge in religious life and in human eschatology, and for his conception of an epistemological hierarchy among human beings. From there I discuss Sadra's conception of spiritual knowledge among the upper echelons o f the epistemo logical hierarchy, a conception that embraces some elements of the traditional Shfi view of spiritual hierarchy, but also departs from it in subtle, but ultimately radical, ways.
Sadra's Philosophy o f Knowledge in the Sharh kitab fa d l al-ilm
Sadra's epistemology as systematically formulated in his philosophi cal writing clearly undergirds his commentary on the Kitab fa d l alJ ilm. As with most aspects of his thought, Mulla Sadra presents his perspective on knowledge and its significance for the human state as rooted in the Qur'an and his own mystico-philosophical interpretation o f the sacred text. W hile the Qur'an sets out an egalitarian principle-all human beings are created according to the same primordial norm (fitra)12 and all human actions are weighed on the same scale and entail the same recompense13-it also establishes a hierarchical principle. If all human beings begin in the same 12 Qur'an 30:30. 13 Qur'an 7:8-9; 21:47. place, they do not all end in the same place, and the twin bases of this teleological differentiation, as expressed in the Qur'an, are the qualities of reverential piety (taqwa)14 and knowledge. 15 Are those who know and those who do not know equal? (39:9)16 the Qur'an asks rhetorically. The answer is meant to be clear, as the Qur'an directly links faith with knowledge and intellect,1 4 1 5 1 6 17 while connecting unbelief to ignorance and short-sightedness.18 1 9 2 0 2 1 The believers are those who reflect on and contemplate God's revelation in scripture and in the world around them, those who use their intellects and seek to understand. 19 The unbelievers are those who refuse to see and to reflect, those who are heedless-willfully ignorant-of what is before them and what is to come. 20 The role that Sadra assigns to knowledge in the human spiritual vocation and spiritual destiny goes somewhat beyond the Qur'an's explicit teachings on this matter. While the Qur'an establishes a relationship between faith and knowledge, it is nonetheless faith and good works that are specifically associated with salvation in the scriptural text, although in Islamic doctrinal formulations, true faith had to be based upon knowledge (malrifa). For Sadra, however, both faith and good works are only "good" (and thus spiritually efficacious) because they are forms of knowledge.21 It is knowledge alone that is spiritually transformative and that ultimately saves. As Sadra writes in his commentary:
You know from what has come before, that religious acts, such as prayer, fasting and so on, are only for the purpose of [attaining] states, [by which] I mean, the cleansing and purification of the heart from evils, earthly desires, and attachments. The purpose of states is the [acquisition] of the sciences ('ulum), and this is the meaning of [the Imam's] words (a.s.): "the perfection of religion is the seeking of knowledge."22 That is, the ultimate objective of religious acts and the obligations of the sharfa is the seeking of knowledge.
Knowledge, then, is of two types: the knowledge of unveiling (ilm mukashafa), that is: knowledge of the Essence of God and of His Attributes and Actions; and knowledge o f daily actions, that is: knowledge that pertains to the manner in which one should accomplish the acts of obedience and refrain from disobedient and evil actions. The objective of the first type is knowledge for its own sake, and the objective of the second is [so that one may] act in accordance with it. But the objective of action is also knowledge. Knowledge is the first and the last, the origin and the end.
Thus one kind of knowledge is a means and the other is an end; [the latter] being the more noble and lofty. Action is only a means, since it belongs to this world, and this world is only a means to the next, and likewise all that belongs to it. There is no benefit in obedience that is not a means to knowledge, and likewise, [there is no benefit] in knowledge that pertains to [obedience], if it is not a means to action which leads to the state, which leads to pure knowledge (ilm ) and sincere knowledge (mtirifa) of the Face of God. 23
While some knowledge can be a means to other knowledge, knowledge is the true end in itself. Even knowledge whose immediate benefit is a proper understanding of religious practice and obedience to divine law is ultimately a means of acquiring more knowledge, since religious practice has no meaningful purpose other than to grant increased spiritual knowledge. If "the objective of action is knowledge," the objective of knowledge is not merely proper action. Rather knowledge must be sought for its own sake.24 22 Quoting the hadith he is commenting upon here, which is found on 14-15 of the Sharh. The Analogous Nature o f Being (wujud) and Knowledge When examining Sadras views on knowledge, it should be noted that while knowledge is, ultimately, the only means by which a person may advance along the spiritual and ontological ladder, and thus is part and parcel of Sadras ontological theory, knowledge and being (wujud) are also construed, independently, in analogous ways. Sadras theory of tashklk al-wujud (ambiguity or gradation of being) posits Being (wujud) as a single, unified reality that underlies and is the source of all existent things, not as something divided and apportioned among them. Rather existent things are differentiated by their varying degrees of participation in wujud as such, resulting in differing levels of "intensity" of being (wujud). An individual's "intensity" of being can increase, raising that individual to higher, nobler and more intellectual levels of existence, without the occur rence o f ontological disjuncture-every lower level o f being is subsumed within the higher, as all being is essentially one,25 with God (the "Necessary Being," wajib al-wujud) alone possessing wujud as such.26 Mulla Sadra understands knowledge in precisely the same way:
. . . the word "knowledge" (cilm) like the word "being" (wujud) is one of those ambiguous (mushakkak) words that has a single common meaning, but differs in the degree of perfection or imperfection, intensity or weak ness, with which it obtains. . .27
Despite its "single common meaning," Sadra explains elsewhere that the word "knowledge" may refer to three different, but related things: 1) "a connection between the knower and that which is known" (idafa bayna al-alim wa-l-malum), which is similar to the principle of the union of the intellecting subject and the object of his intellection (ittihad alJ aqil wa-l-malqul), a fundamental theme in all of Sadras writing; 2) "the image that obtains in the soul" of a concrete reality that it knows, be it knowledge of a universal reality or a particular one; and 3) the faculty rooted in the human soul (al-malaka al-rasikha) through which things come to be known and truths are manifested.28 For Sadra, knowledge exists in itself and for its own sake, while it also denotes that faculty by which all things come to be known and a mode of relation between knower and known. Analogously, "being" (wujud) exists in and of itself, and is also that by which all other existent things have their being, just as light exists and can be seen in itself, but is also that by which all other things are seen. 29 If knowledge is analogous to being in its gradated existence, it is also, from another perspective, a reality possessing being or wujud-and indeed, possessing being in the highest degree. This is because, for Sadra, the highest echelons of being are occupied by those existents that are immaterial in nature. Knowledge-both as a faculty and as the final end of this faculty-represents purely immaterial reality: "Knowledge, for the intellect, is a conveyor of the presence of immaterial form to the exclusion of materials and bodies, and there is no doubt that the noblest of possible existents and the highest and the most radiant of them is that existent that is not attached to bodily things."30 Being immaterial in its own nature, the acquisition and possession of knowledge advances an individual toward increasingly intellectual and immaterial modes of his own existence. For Sadra, knowledge plays the most important role in the final entelechy of every human being, given that it represents the faculty and the means by which an individual proceeds from one ontological level to the next.31 Knowledge nourishes the intellectual faculty, whose increasing maturation and intensification in turn yields the possibility of acquiring higher levels of spiritual-indeed salvific-knowledge. Both pure knowledge itself and the faculty for acquiring that knowledge, the intellect (aql), are immaterial reali ties. The more one strengthens the faculty of intellect, the more one grasps the true knowledge of things-that is, in their immaterial reality-for the like can only know the like. The more one knows the reality of things, and is able to extract their immaterial reality from their bodily and imaginal manifesta tions, the more one extracts one's own spiritual reality from its bodily form, thereby making "epistemology an exercise in ontology"'32 Sadra writes:
. . . the intellect (aql) is a form (sura) which is separate from matter, change, deficiency, nothingness, and evil.
[It is] the closest of all created things to Him, the A ll High, and the noblest of all existentiated things in His sight. Man, in his first mode of being, is potential in intellect (aql bi-l-quwwa) and actual in corporeality (jismanl bi-l-fiJ) and it is part of his vocation to move from potentiality to actuality and from darkness to light, and thus to become actual intellect after having been potential intellect and actual soul. And it is only through knowledge that one becomes an illuminated substance (jawhar nuranl), that is to say, through that faculty which is established and obtained in the human soul subsequent to repeated intellectual perceptions and insights and through prolonged, intelligent thought and contemplation. . .
And this intellectual faculty is the source of all happi ness and goodness and the repulsion of all misery and evil, and it is the goal of all effort and movement and the end of all right action and obedience. And what virtue or good quality is better and nobler than that through which the human animal is transformed into an angel drawn nigh, and the dark substance into an intellectual light, and blindness into vision and the one who was in error into one who is rightly guided and rightly guiding, and the lowest into the highest and the one who had been imprisoned in the lowest depths (sijjln) into one who soars to the the most exalted heights Cilliyln).33 32 Ibrahim Kalin, Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mulla Sadra on Existence, Intellect, and Intuition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), xv. 33 This is a reference to the Qur'anic dyad, "sijjln" and "Hlliyun" (Qur'an 83:7-8, [18] [19] , which some interpret as referring to the lowest level of Hell and the highest realm of Paradise, respectively.
Thus knowledge is the great elixir, since through it the black and stagnant heart becomes valuable currency in the market of the hereafter and hard and rigid iron becomes a white pearl, indeed a luminous star34 which gives light to the inhabitants of heaven and earth. And it is the antidote through which one discerns truth from falsehood and through which one is able to distinguish wickedness from goodness, and it is the light which brings the dead back to life and which advances before and to the right of the believers35 on the Day on which good and evil deeds are recompensed, and it is the capability through which one is able to ascend to the realm of the Throne.36
Knowledge is the sole means through which human beings can fulfill their ultimate, and indeed, only vocation. Therefore, the continuous acquisition of knowledge is incumbent upon all people, regardless of the level of knowledge they may have already attained.37
If the concepts of being and knowledge are parallel in their unified and gradated natures, and linked in their teleological ori entation toward immateriality, Sadra also posits the unfolding o f knowledge from one level to the next in a way that parallels his conception o f ontological movement, which he refers to as "substantial motion" (al-haraka al-jawhariyya). According to Sadra, human ontological development occurs initially through a divine overflowing or effusion (ifada) of being until it reaches the level of the human form. Once having reached this form, a human being becomes responsible for using his own faculty of intellect to move upward toward greater degrees of ontological perfection. This view approximates the Avicennan emanationist scheme in a general way, but as Ibrahim Kalin has recently argued, Sadra's formulation places much less emphasis than Ibn Sina does on the role of the "active intellect" (alJ aql al-fa'al), and union therewith, as a means of intellectual advancement and realization, seeing the process as one that is primarily driven by the individual's own effort, and his 34 An allusion to Qur'an 24:35, the "Light Verse." 35 A reference to Qur'an 57:12. 36 Sharh, 51-52. 37 Sharh, 8-9; see also 76, where he says that the acquisition of knowledge is obligatory on the basis of sunna, consensus, and intellectual proof.
own internal, if potential, intellectual faculties.38 For example, in a commentary on a hadlth attributed to cAli b. Abi Talib which states that seeking knowledge is more incumbent on men than the seeking of wealth, Sadra contrasts wealth, which is divided and apportioned by divine decree, with knowledge, which is acquired only through an individual's concerted effort to acquire it.39 While Sadra may not assign a central role to the active intellect in a human being's movement from one level of existence to another, he does acknowledge the role that human "knowers," or teachers, play in assisting the downward flow of knowledge from the divine principle of all knowledge to its human seekers.40 These advanced knowers absorb divine knowledge into their own being, such that they are transformed into the very "coffers o f God," that is, the storehouses of His knowledge in the earthly realm:
. . . verily knowledge is stored in the coffers o f God, hidden from both lofty and base minds, and [these coffers] are the people of knowledge. Mankind, in his primordial state, is empty of [this knowledge] by virtue of his being far removed from [any] relationship to the lofty world of the malakut, and it is only possible for him to become one of the people of knowledge and to accumulate [it] if he seeks [it] and exercises contempla tion and effort and devotes himself to the purification of the heart and its refinement until he comes to resemble the mines of knowledge and the coffers of true knowl edge (matrifa), like a piece o f hot iron resembles fire through its proximity to it, and thus becomes like it in its properties o f illumination and burning. Likewise, individual men, if they contemplate the malakut and seek knowledge with perseverance in acquiring it, come to resemble an intellectual coffer and become like it.41
Here Sadra's transformative view of knowledge is poetically conveyed as he compares the individual seeking knowledge to a piece of iron moving ever closer to the fire. When close enough to the fire, the iron becomes red hot, and so acquires not only light and heat, but also properties of illumination and burning that originally belong to the fire itself. While remaining iron, it has nonetheless been transformed so that it possesses in a virtual but efficacious way the ontological qualities of fire, and is capable of actively transmitting those quali ties to something other than itself. Having sought out the coffers of divine knowledge, the seekers have become coffers themselves. The knowing human soul, enlightened by divine knowledge, comes to possess perfection and luminosity in such fullness that it overflows and becomes, not only a passive recipient of knowledge and "light," but also an active illuminator of others.42
Thus the transformation of the learner into a teacher is not achieved by the mere quantitative accumulation o f knowledge, but via a process o f substantial transformation that makes him resemble the very divine source of knowledge he had been seeking. The teacher exists on a higher ontological level43-a level of greater intensity o f being (wujud)-able not merely to disseminate his acquired knowledge, but to assist others in their own ontological transformation. The ontologically transformative process of teaching and learning is discussed throughout his commentary on the Kitab fa d l alJ ilm, and in one passage, Sadra makes this point through an interesting reference to the Q uranic license to use hunting dogs. Although dogs are generally considered unclean in Islamic tradition, the Qur'an allows people to consume the meat of animals caught by trained hunting dogs. The relevant verse reads, in part, Say, "Lawful unto you are all good things." A nd as fo r the hunting dogs you have taught, teaching them from that which God has taught you, eat o f that which they catch fo r you (5:4). Sadra does not quote the verse, but is clearly alluding to it when he says, "Indeed the prey of a 'taught' (mu'allam) dog is pure, purified by the blessing of knowledge, even though he was originally impure."44 The implication is that because the dog has been "taught" some of the knowledge that God had "taught" its master, the dog's original ontological state of impurity (najas) has been transformed. Given the importance of human teachers in the acquisition of knowledge, and thus in human ontological transformation, Sadra stresses the importance of seeking knowledge from qualified teachers and through interaction with learned men:
Verily, many religious as well as earthly aims cannot be obtained except by seeking the assistance of another and the greatest of all of these is the acquisition of knowledge and understanding in religion, for this is the greatest and most important of all acts of worship and obedience and this is impossible except through interacting (mukhalata) and conversing with teachers and learned men. . .
Thus the one who is in need of learning, inasmuch as it is a religious duty upon him, which he cannot fail to accomplish, for such a person, seclusion is forbidden. And he would be in disobedience to God were he to seclude himself in his home, unless it was the case that he was not capable of the discussion and examination of the sciences (culum), and he would prefer to occupy himself with worship and content himself with following what he has heard, and with what he has believed from the outset. It is thus not unreasonable that seclusion in the case of such a man should be preferable. . . though in the worship of an ignorant man there is little good.
As for one who is capable of acquiring distinction in the sciences of religion and the principles of certitude, in his case, secluding himself before he acquires learning and understanding is clear profligacy. For this reason, someone said: "Acquire understanding, and then practice seclusion."45 Although Sadra himself retired from public life for lengthy periods of time at least twice in his life, he insists that the practice of seclu sion is only legitimate for one who is truly incapable of learning and thus of benefitting from learned company, or for one who has already acquired sufficient learning from others.46 45 Ibid., 34. 46 Sadra elsewhere describes the true "friends of God" (dustdaran-i khudavand, likely a direct Perisan translation of the Arabic, awliya' Allah) as those who prefer solitude to engaging too much in the world and the company of others;
Knowledge and Eschatology
For Sadra, salvation is dependent upon the progressive and inex haustible seeking of knowledge, and upon the sincerity and faithful ness of the seeking. But knowledge is not only the path to a blissful life in the hereafter, it is also the essential content and ontological reality of that life, for "the hereafter is none other than the capac ity for knowledge and perception (idrak)" 47 The Garden is pure knowledge, for verily the perfection of pleasure is in the perception of the Beloved and the perfection of pain is in remoteness from the Beloved. . . the deeper and more intense the perception, and the nobler, more perfect, more permanent and purer that which is perceived, the nobler and more intense will be the pleasure.48 Pleasure in the hereafter is not material in nature, nor can it be measured in physical terms; rather pleasure and pain in this context are measured by one's ability to perceive the divine realities of the hereafter. To the extent that one has cultivated the faculty for such perception in this life, one will be joyful in the next; to the extent that one has allowed this faculty to atrophy, one will be tortured by the eternal obscuration of these blessed realities. Most people, according to Sadra, never reach the level of pure intellect, and remain at the level of the imaginal soul. Even these may be resurrected, however, since they have managed to reach an ontological degree that has some separation from pure matter.49 But because their capacity to perceive intellectual realities has not been fully developed, they are unable to fully enjoy the intellectual pleasures of Paradise.50
Those who reach the highest levels o f spiritual knowledge and being are most removed from their physical nature, and have see Sadra, Irfan va € arif namayan, trans. Bidarfar, 97-98. In the passage above, however, he indicates that gaining real knowledge from others must precede this, at least for most people. thus virtually attained or approximated "immateriality." They are not only more capable of perceiving intellectual realities, but also more capable o f being intellectually perceived themselves since they are more " intelligible." Thus when commenting upon the controversial issue o f God's "gazing upon" the righteous in the next life as mentioned in the context of a hadlth attributed to Jacfar al-Sadiq, Sadra indicates that God, being perfectly immaterial, can only know, or "gaze upon," immaterial realities, that is, the inner, non-material aspect o f things. Thus only those who possess an inner "heart illuminated by knowledge" will enjoy the otherworldly blessing of God's gaze.51 5 2 All acquisition of knowledge leads to ontological transformation, but it does not always lead to spiritual advancement or salvation. Knowledge must be sought out and acquired from human teachers, but one must use this knowledge in conjunction with various religious and spiritual practices to bring about a positive spiritual transformation. Sadra often speaks of intellectual advancement in conjunction with the purification of the soul, tazkiyyat or tasfiyyat al-nafs,52 while also warning o f the danger o f seeking mystical insights without the intellectual preparation that sufficient knowledge provides. In his commentary on the Kitab al-hujja[The book of proof] in Kulayni's Usul al-kafl, Sadra states that the true path to God is found at the juncture (barzakh) of intellectual contemplation (tafakkur) and spiritual purification (tasfiyya). This, he tells us, was the way of both al-Ghazali and the Illuminationists (Ishraqiyyin).53 Thus there are those who acquire knowledge in this life, but perish in the next for lack of spiritual practice and sincerity. In fact, Sadra asserts that their punishment will be even more intense than that of ordinary sinners, because of their heightened faculties of perception:
. . . for the changes brought about by the practice of the speculative sciences and educational exercises move 51 Ibid., 25. 52 See, for example, 47, where he states that God has favored mankind with two potential capabilities-one for knowledge and the other for patience and suppressing passions and vain desires; and when both are brought to fruition, they yield spiritual advancement. Sadra frequently connects the acquisition of knowledge with the purification of the soul; see, e.g., Sharh, 17, 20, 46, 59, 83. 53 Ibid., 423. souls intensely, and bring whatever characteristics or actions were hidden in their essences from potentiality to actuality, regardless o f whether these are good or evil in nature. And the soul, when it strengthens and intensifies and moves from potentiality to actuality, its experience of pain and loss. . . is stronger, and its experience o f torture derived from its perception o f torturous things and its attaining to hateful things is more intense, in contrast to more deficient souls who remain in potentiality regarding both evil and good [characteristics], such as the mentally deficient (bulk), children and others who are weak of soul, and the rest of the common people who are not capable of saving themselves (la yastatiuna hila) and are not guided to any way (la yaktaduna sabil).54 For these, because of the limitedness of their substances and the deficiency of their minds, when they are punished, their punishment is not intense, but likewise, when they are rewarded, their reward is not great.55
Here, as elsewhere, Sadra indicates that acquiring knowledge hardly lets one off the hook, so to speak, in terms of the next world. In fact, he asserts that "the danger of knowledge is greater than the danger of ignorance, and God's argument against the people of knowledge is more certain, and He will tolerate from the ignorant that which He would not tolerate a tenth thereof from the knower."56 The cor ruption of the best is the worst. , where Sadra states that one of the exquisite tor ments of the false or worldly knower in the hereafter is witnessing his former students who, unlike himself, took his teachings sincerely and used them to spiritually transform and advance themselves, in the bliss of paradise, while he is in hell; indicating that the power of knowledge exists independent of its conduit.
The Hierarchy of True Knowers
It is clear that knowledge forms the basis o f Sadras conception of ontological and spiritual hierarchy in this world and the next. However, this hierarchy is not based on the pure accumulation or quantity of knowledge, but rather on the quality of that knowledge, the purity and perfection of its source, and the reality and profun dity of its transformative effect on the soul. One must begin the ontological journey by seeking knowledge from human teachers, as Sadra makes clear, but which knowledge and which teachers? Are there certain religious sciences that should be preferred to others as a means o f acquiring, or preparing oneself to receive, higher forms o f knowledge, and who holds the keys to these sciences? These questions lead us to examine Sadras views on the nature of religious learning and the religious sciences of his time, which take up considerable space in his commentary on the Kitab fa d l alJ ilm.
Sadra on the Religious Scholarship of His Time
Sadra lived within the intellectually vibrant and contentious social context of the Safavid empire at its political peak. Both Sufi and Shfi approaches to Islam flourished concurrently, and often competed with each other for political and social influence. Within Safavid Shfism and Sufism, the intellectual approaches of the scholarly elite co-existed, sometimes uneasily, with popular and purely devotional manifestations. Sadra stood, no doubt, with the scholarly elite, but the ShH scholars were themselves divided into two approaches to religious knowledge: the Akhbaris, who viewed the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet and the Imams as the most reliable sources of religious knowledge and religious law, and collectively as a sufficient source; and the Usulis, who felt that religious law had to be arrived at through an arduous process of ijtihad which included a careful weighing of the Qur'an and traditions of the Prophet and the Imams within a system of jurisprudential and rational principles (usul). While the Akbari/Usuli debate principally concerned Islamic law, it came to have implications for other fields as well. For example, since the Akhbaris relied primarily upon "transmitted" (naqlt), rather than "intellectual" (aqlt) sources of religious knowledge, they tended not to look favorably on the more caqli sciences of philosophy and certain forms of mysticism.57 Lying at the heart of the Akhbari/Usuli debate was the fundamental issue of what should be considered the true source of religious knowledge and, by extension, who could claim religious authority on the basis of such knowledge. Sadra has much to say about the provenance of true religious knowledge in his commentary, and is highly critical of those who claim status and authority on the basis of what he considers to be the mere pretense of scholarly attainment. So where do we locate Sadra with regard to these two approaches to religious knowledge? The very fact, noted above, that Sadra devoted precious time during what is believed to be the last years of his life to this com mentary on the transmitted traditions of the Imams would suggest some sympathy for the Akhbari view. This was the view ascendant in his own time, which held that such traditions represented an essential and reliable source o f religious knowledge. Moreover, Sadra devotes extensive space in this work to discussing the isnads attached to the traditions he comments upon, providing sometimes voluminous notes on the transmitters as found in the rijal literature. He thus gives the appearance o f taking the transmitted (naqll) science of hadlth quite seriously, and he is careful to attend to the methodological concerns of this science before launching into his metaphysical commentary on the traditions.
At the same time, throughout the commentary, Sadra is critical of those who limit themselves purely to the acquisition of the trans mitted (naqll) sciences. He derides and belittles those who memorize the words of dead men,58 and who collect reports, traditions, and scholarly opinions like trinkets, rather than concerning themselves with the divine sciences and the transcendent knowledge they need to transform themselves from lower ontological and epistemological states to higher ones. For example, he describes those who falsely claim knowledge, while being spiritually "ignorant" :
[This is] the one who is ignorant of heart, deceived and deluded, claiming to possess knowledge because he has memorized opinions (aqwal), and undertaken journeys, and because he is seated in the company o f shaykhs and learned men (rijal), when his true state is that he is ignorant and possesses no knowledge, and his heart is blind, without insight (baslra), self-satisfied with what he possesses of the outward aspects o f opinions, and the forms of ahadlth, and theological disputations, and philosophical sophistries, or supposedly Sufi fantasies and distortions, or poetic orations through which he attracts com m on souls and the rest o f the "worldly scholars" (Julama' al-dunya) who are fooled by him, and [who is] drawn to money and high position and prestige and fame, and he is one whom the life of the world has deceived away from the hereafter.59
. . . Know that most of those in delusion and conceit are a group who are limited to the knowledge offatwas and rules, and the memorization of issues of halal and haram, and who claim that this is knowledge of religion and knowledge of the Book of God and knowledge of the sunna of the Lord of the Messengers [Muhammad] , and who abandon knowledge of the path to the hereafter, and struggling against the soul, and purifying one's inner state of blameworthy qualities, and forbidding the soul from passions, and purifying the heart through ascetic practice. . . and who reject entirely the path of gnosis and religious understanding. . .60
One might be tempted to read Sadra's contempt for those who marked religious and intellectual status on the basis of an ability to reproduce the words of others as a stance against the Akhbari school, which advocated reliance on transmitted teachings in the attainment of religious knowledge. Reading this and other passages carefully, however, we see that Sadra's critique is not directed at any one school of thought, but is rather an attack on intellectual pretension,61 on worldly approaches to religious learning,62 and on small-mindedness in all its forms. In the passages quoted above, Sadra is equally disparaging of those obsessed with other matters he considers petty and spiritu ally useless, even when they fall in the domain of the caqli sciences, including theological debates, "philosophical sophistries," and "Sufi fantasies" He is critical in general of those who spend their time in what his contemporaries might have considered "intellectual pur suits" but which bring one no closer to an understanding of spiritual reality. For example, he criticizes those who concern themselves with the legal minutiae of various hypothetical legal scenarios,63 or who engage in theological debate merely to prove their intel lectual dominance.64 In fact, at times he compares the perspective of the naqli traditionists favorably with those who substitute their own individual opinion (ra'y) on a religious matter for the known teachings of the Prophet and the Imams.65 In his commentary on the numerous ahadith in Kulayni's chapter on the Imams' strident rejection of the practice of qiyas in determining legal rulings, Sadra follows the tone of the Imams' antipathy to this practice. He asserts that qiyas offers "neither sound knowledge nor a strong opinion" (zann qawi),66 and in fact leads to a spiritually destructive pride and desire for worldly dominance that one does not find among those who limit themselves to the naqli sciences, which do not provide the same prestige.67 O f course, even the Usulis did not engage in qiyas strictly speaking, given the Imams' widely reported prohibition, but Sadra's commentary elsewhere suggests criticism of those who consider ijtihad, more generally, as a reliable method of arriving at truth.68 and 320 where true knowledge comes neither from "hearing," that is the naqli sciences, nor from ijtihad. On 97 the knowledge of the mujtahidin and those who practice the speculative sciences is likened to the light of flames and lamps, in contrast to the more "celestial" light of true knowers, because their knowledge does not come directly from the essential source of knowledge, just as the light of flames and lamps does not come directly from the sun.
Taken as a whole, his commentary indicates that he is not critical of any one school of thought or any one branch of the reli gious sciences; rather his criticism is directed against all who seek knowledge with worldly intention, as well as those who would limit necessary and worthwhile religious knowledge to any one form, be it theology, jurisprudence, Quranic recitation, hadlth transmission, or the experiential knowledge of Sufism divorced from other forms of religious knowledge.69 For Sadra, these sciences are a means to an ultimate end, which is access to the divine knowledge that transcends and is the source of them all.70 He writes, . . . every universal principle of knowledge has an open ing onto the acquisition of this luminous faculty called guidance, since even if it is speculative, it has an essential effect on the illumination of the heart; and if it is practi cal, it has an effect through the intermediary of acting upon it, with regard to purifying the inward nature and refining the mind and purifying the soul.71
The truth may be accessed by many different paths, and all sound knowledge, when it is undertaken with proper intention, leads in the direction of "purifying" and "refining" the soul.
Whatever the political situation o f Sadra may have been at various points in his life-and the existing biographical evidence does not seem sufficient to determine his political position with any real certainty72-the virulence of his criticism of those who trafficked insincerely or ignorantly in the religious sciences can be sufficiently explained by his transcendent conception of knowledge itself, as the single path by which one might purify and save one's soul, and by which one reaches the very proximity of God. It seems clear that one who held such a view as consistently and, it appears, sincerely, as Sadra did, would have little tolerance for those who peddled knowledge in the intellectual marketplace for worldly 69 Ibid., 4-5. 70 Ibid., 55, 60. 71 Ibid., 83. 72 See, in general, Rizvi, "Reconsidering the Life of Mulla Sadra." Nonethe less, hints of political motivations behind at least some of his criticism can be seen in places where he chides the "worldly scholars" for aiding the "sultans of oppression" and the "commanders of injustice" (umara' al-jawr); see Shark, 135. gain. Furthermore, for Sadra, knowledge, like being, was a unitive reality, differing only in intensity, and so there could be no toler ance for those who would divide knowledge into separate, isolated branches, or make them compete in importance. Most importantly, for Sadra, the acquisition of knowledge was theorized, and meant to be experienced, as a purely vertical movement toward greater intensity of being and proximity to the divine. Those who considered knowledge to be the mere collecting o f variant opinions would seem, by contrast, to be traversing a purely horizontal plane-and the "journey for knowledge" much celebrated in Islamic intellectual history but dismissed by Sadra,73 is a perfect metaphor for this "horizontal" pursuit. Perhaps a more important consideration when trying to situate Sadra's epistemology in the context of the intellectual politics of his day, particularly in relation to the Akhbari/Usuli debate, was the extent to which those on both sides o f this debate represent an epistemological break from the Shi i scholars of earlier times. While it might seem natural to view the Akhbari/Usuli divide as a continuation of the traditionalist/rationalist scholarly divide of the fourth/tenth-fifth/eleventh centuries, Robert Gleave explains in two recent studies of the Akhbari school that while the traditionalist and rationalist Shfi scholars of earlier times held that the attainment of certain religious knowledge was possible, albeit via competing scholarly methodologies, both the Akhbaris and the Usulis of the Safavid era accepted and worked with the assumption of varying degrees of "inevitable doubt" in religious knowledge, particularly as regards formulations of the law.74 Sadra, by contrast, was clearly in pursuit of certain knowledge that approximated, or perhaps even reached, the knowledge of the prophets themselves.75 Given this, the Akhbari/Usuli debate, with its competing strategies for managing uncertainty in matters of religious (particularly legal) knowledge, would have meant little to Sadra, at least intellectually.
Sadra has a terminology and a set of metaphors that he repeat edly draws upon to distinguish between the spiritually and ontologi cally transformative knowledge that he considered to be the only real vocation of human life, and the various intellectual and transmitted sciences that passed for religious knowledge in the society of his time. He refers to those scholars who were masters of the traditional religious sciences as the "conventional knower(s)," using the phrases al-alim a l-rasm f6 or culama' al-rusum, which he claims to have adopted from cAbd al-Razzaq al-Qashani's, Istilahat al-sufiyya.7 6 77 7 8 7 9 8 0 He also makes widespread use o f Ghazali's division o f religious knowledge into "knowledge of transactions" ( ilm al-mUamalat), which can be known through transmitted reports and through human reasoning, and "knowledge of unveiling" (Jlm mukashafa),7S which can only be attained through divine bestowal, usually after a long period of spiritual and intellectual preparation. Like Ghazali, Sadra maintains that only a tiny minority of people attain to the "knowledge of unveiling," and that such people are "rarer than red sulfur,"79 although he criticizes Ghazali for limiting the pursuit of this knowledge to those who are spiritually unsatisfied by the 7ilm differences between various kinds of knowers through an analogy to different intensities and sources of light. The knowledge of the prophets and the saints (awliyti) is like the light of the sun, which illuminates by its own divinely-bestowed essence and nature, and is dependent upon no external source for its light; the light of the advanced and serious "knowers" who take their knowledge from the prophets and the saints is like the light of the moon and the fixed planets, which give off a less intense light that is nonetheless a reflection of the light of the sun, and on which they are dependent; the sincere worshippers, who do not possess or seek advanced knowledge, are like the stars, which give off even less light, and whose minimal light is effaced by the presence of the full moon.81 According to Sadra, it was the ancient Persian philosophers who first realized this analogy, but it was later expounded by his Ishraqi predecessor, Suhrawardi, whom he quotes in this context.82
If Sadra borrows much of the terminology for his hierarchy of knowledge from his predecessors, his discussion of this hierarchy as it is found in the Shark usul al-kafi also makes use, perhaps inevitably, o f Shi i terminology and conceptual frameworks that would be deeply resonant to a learned Shfi audience; but he broadens and nuances those terms and frameworks in ways that simultaneously reinforce and undermine key Shfi notions of spiritual hierarchy. I will review some of these hierarchical conceptions of knowledge as found in Twelver Shi i tradition, and then analyze Sadra's use and modification of these ideas in his commentary.
Shici Views o f Ontological/Epistemological Hierarchy: The Fixed Status o f the Imams
At the heart of Shfi notions regarding the spiritual authority of the Imams is the belief that they possess extraordinary-even miracu lous-knowledge. The term "'alim" is used in Shi i hadlth literature to refer to the Imam,83 and the Imams are collectively identified with select groups of "knowers" in the Qur'an. When the Qur'an asks, "Are those who know and those who do not know equal?,"84 a Shfi hadith attributed to Muhammad al-Baqir reads this as a refer ence to the spiritual distinction of the Imams.85 When the Qur'an declares that none knows the inner meaning of its verses except "those firmly-rooted in knowledge" (al-rasikhuna ft l-ilm ),86 this is likewise understood as a reference to the Imams.87 The Imams were considered to be the referents of other Q uranic terms of nobility: they were, of course, the "People of the House" (ahl al-bayt),ss and the possessors of authority (ulu l-amr)S9 who had to be obeyed.90 They were also the awliyaJ (sing., wali), the true possessors of the spiritual station of walaya. This is based, in part, on an interpretation of Qur'an 5:55 that identifies the awliya' of the believers as being God, the Prophet, and those who believe, who perform the prayer, and give the zakah, while bowing down. Both Shfi and Sunni sources widely consider this verse to refer specifically to cAli b. Abi Talib; thus cAli is the wali of the believers, a title that can then be extended to the Imams among his descendants. The identification of Ali and the other Imams as wali/awliya' is also based on the famous Ghadir Khumm hadith, wherein the Prophet said, "For whomever I am their master (mawla, var. wali), cAli is also their master; O God, befriend (wali) the friend of cAli (man walahu) and be the enemy of his enemy."91
The Imams were the true "heirs of the Prophet" and are believed to have exclusively inherited esoteric knowledge of the Qur'an and other spiritual teachings from the Prophet Muhammad through cAli. According to Shfl hadith literature, this exclusively "transmit ted" knowledge was further enhanced by miraculous and divinely bestowed intellectual capabilities (for example, a knowledge of multiple sacred languages),92 by secret esoteric writings and books 8 5 8 6 8 7 8 8 8 9 9 0 9 1 9 2 in their possession,93 and by a form of indirect divine inspiration.94 No single technical term was definitively ascribed to the Imams' special mode of divine inspiration;95 rather, the Imams were said to be those who were "spoken to" (muhaddath).96 The followers of the Imams were similarly considered to enjoy access to a more elite spiritual and intellectual station by virtue of their attachment to the Imams. A tradition attributed to Muhammad al-Baqir, for example, identifies his Shi i followers with the Q uranic ulu l-albab, or "people of intellect;"97 and a widely reported tradition states that the teachings of the Imams are difficult, and that only "an angel drawn nigh, or a sent prophet, or the heart of a believer that has been tested for faith" (understood to mean the learned among the Imams' followers) can truly grasp them,98 thus placing learned Shfis in the company of angels and prophets as those who alone can bear the weight of the Imams' teachings.
A Sadrian View o f the Hierarchy o f Knowers: The Prophets and the AwliyaJ
In his commentary, Sadra frequently mentions "the prophets and the awliya'," as those who together occupy the highest level of his ontological and spiritual hierarchy. He considers both to be analogous to the sun, radiating knowledge from their very essence, rather than passively transmitting the knowledge of others. However, the role of walaya in Sadra's formulation of ontological hierarchy, coupled with his obvious reverence for the Imams, has led some to overstate, perhaps, the importance of strictly Shfi conceptions of walaya and imama in his work.99 For it is clear, even in Sadra's com m entary on the sayings o f the Imams themselves, that the category of the awliyal includes not only the Imams, or even the Imams and their most learned followers, but rather extends to all who have been ontologically transformed through the acquisition o f knowledge and the practices o f spiritual purification. Sadra describes this expanded category of saintly knowers using terms often associated with the Imams in mainstream Twelver Shfi tradition: they are those "firmly-rooted in knowledge" (rasikhuna ft l-cilm),100 they are the "People of the House," 101 and they are the "possessors of authority" (ulu l-amr).102 Sadra bases his more inclusive view of the category of saintly knowers (awliya1) on a correspondingly broader interpretation of "descent" and "inheritance" from the Prophet. If access to extraordinary sources of knowledge was an inheri tance that Shfi tradition claims the Imams received from the Prophet, for Sadra they were not the only heirs. In Sadra's view, the Prophet and cAli had both genealogical descendants and "spiritual" descen dants, such that it was possible to speak about a group of "spiritual heirs" to prophetic knowledge-a group that includes the Imams, but was not limited to them. Sadra writes, citing a "recent authority" :
One of the contemporary, distinguished [thinkers] has said, with regard to [this issue], in brief: " The family o f the Prophet (s.a.w.a.s.) are all those who descend from him, and of these there are two types. The first is the one who descends from him as a form al and bodily consequence, such as his offspring and those of his blood relations who proceed from him, for whom the accepting of charity is forbidden according to the Muhammadan sharTa; and the second is the one who descends from him as an immaterial and spiritual conse quence, and these are his spiritual children among those firmly-rooted in knowledge and the perfected saints and the divine sages who draw from his lamp-niche, whether they precede him in time or are contemporary [or posterior] to him." And there is no doubt that the second relation is surer than the first, and if the two are combined, then it is "light upon light" such as is the case with the well-known Imams from the pure family (a.s.) And just as formal [material] charity is forbidden to his formal [bodily] offspring, likewise is spiritual charity forbidden to his spiritual children-that is to say, the blind imitation (taqlld) of another in the sciences and in true knowledge.103
Here the spiritual descendants of the Prophet are identified as those who "draw from [the Prophetic] lamp-niche," as well as those "firmly-rooted in knowledge" -a phrase that, as noted above, was usually understood as a reference to the Imams in Imami hadlth literature. Thus these spiritual descendants of the Prophet, like the Imams, have access to extraordinary sources o f knowledge that place them in a category hierarchically above the ordinary believer. Sadra then makes the apt analogy that just as the material (genea logical) descendants of the Prophet are forbidden from accepting material charity, so too are his spiritual descendants forbidden from accepting spiritual charity-that is, the blind acceptance o f the doctrinal positions o f others-since like the genealogical descendants of the Imams, they are "fed" from a higher source.104
Sadra does not put all "spiritual descendants" of the Prophet on equal footing. The Imams who can claim both genealogical and spiritual descent from the Prophet occupy a unique rank-they are "light upon light." 105 Elsewhere, Sadra tells us that the "trustees" (awsiyff), meaning the Imams, are "the most exalted of the knowers, the best and the greatest of them [other than the prophets], while the knowers are the lords of the [ordinary] people (nos)." 106 On the basis of this comment, Sadra's conception of a spiritual hierarchy based on knowledge would place the prophets at the pinnacle, fol lowed by the trustees (awsiyaJ), then the saintly "knowers" outside the categories o f the prophets and the aw siyaj and finally, the ordinary people. This is similar to what one finds in Shfi tradition as well, which recognized a hierarchical relationship between learned Shfa107 and the more purely devotional Shfi population, as well as non-Shfa. The learned Shfis were the elite (khassa) as compared with the "commoners" ( amma or simply nas). In places, Sadra seems to embrace the idea that the learned Shfa occupy a spiritual and intellectual position above others,108 although this is somewhat belied by the greater extent to which he relies on non-Shf! thinkers as influences for his own philosophical thought.
Having explicitly expanded the concepts o f "true knowers," "those firmly rooted in knowledge" and even the "People o f the House" (ahl al-bayt) beyond identification solely with the Imams, and having identified them as the awliya' and the "spiritual descendants" of the Prophet, Sadra goes on to make bold statements about the cosmological and spiritual role of this expanded group. In particu lar, Sadra attributes to the "saints" the same, or similar, access to extraordinary sources of knowledge as enjoyed by the Imams, and indeed, as we shall see, even the prophets. While Sadra often groups the prophets and the saints together as those who have access to the highest form of knowledge-knowledge that comes directly from the divine, rather than through human transmission-he usually refers to the divine inspiration received by the saints as ilham, a less direct form of inspiration than that designated by the terms tanzll or wahy, usually associated with the prophets. In one passage, Sadra comments on a hadlth attributed to the Prophet through Jafar al-Sadiq which says, "For every harmful religious innovation (bida) that will arise after me, and that threatens to undermine faith, there will be a wall from the People of my House who will be charged with refuting it, speaking through inspiration (ilham) from God, publicly proclaiming and illuminating the truth. . . " 109 1 1 0 For Sadra, this hadith, which employs the terms "people o f the house" and "wall" in connection with ilham, indicates that the awliya1, along with the prophets and the Imams, have an important role to play in bringing corrective divine guidance to the human community. In his commentary on this hadith, he presents the officially accepted distinction between the prophets and the awliya1, indicating that the prophets are aided by wahy and evidentiary miracles (m ujizat), while the awliya1 are aided by ilham and lesser miracles (karamat). Nevertheless, he indicates that both types of divine "aid" are the result of the overflowing of divine light upon the hearts of the prophets and the awliya1,110 thus locating the origin of the epistemological and ontological status of both groups in their direct relationship with the divine.
Sadra argues that true knowledge comes not from books or scholarly transmission, but only from divine inspiration that falls upon a heart spiritually prepared to receive it.111 Shi i tradition, however, maintains that one of the primary sources of the Imams' knowledge is a unique series o f books and written texts in their possession, whereby the special knowledge of the Prophet, or even previous prophets, was conveyed to them. Sadra does not refute this belief directly, but suggests that such references might be meant as metaphors for inward states of knowledge.112 Commenting on a hadith that states that the answers the Imams give their disciples' come directly from the Messenger of God, Sadra writes: Rather, the intended meaning is that their holy souls are filled with the light of knowledge and the strength of gnosis because of following the Messenger (s.a.w.a.s.) in spiritual striving (mujahida), and spiritual exercises (riyada), along with their inherent state o f spiritual preparation (istidad aslt) and clarity (safa') and purity (tahara) of mind, such that they become like a polished mirror turned in the direction of the truth through the intermediary of another mirror, or without intermediary. Do you not see that the mirror prepared for reflection and the reflection of the other mirror are turned in the direction of the sun and reflect the radiance of the sun to all? Thus the state of one who follows the Messenger (s.a.w.a.s.) with a true following becomes the beloved of the Real, the All-High, and in His words, the All-High: "If you love God, then follow me and God will love you" (3:31). And whomever God loves, He makes divine lights overflow upon him (afada dlayhi), as He makes them overflow upon His beloved [Muhammad] (s.a.w.a.s.), although the difference is firmly established between the followed and the follower.
And in general, one should know that the knowledge of the Imams (a.s.) is not based on ijtihad, or on hearing transmitted reports through the senses. Rather their knowledge is unveiled (kashfiyya), presential (laduniyya), the lights of knowledge and gnosis having overflowed upon their hearts from God, glory be to Him, not through the intermediary of something based on sensible hearing or writing or upon a report, or anything of this sort.
An indication of what we have just explained and its clarification is Thus the most important spiritual bequest from the Prophet to cAli was not specific religious teachings that could then be transmitted verbatim to other Imams and their disciples; rather it was knowledge of the spiritual exercises-similar to those practiced by other mystics in Islam-which prepared the heart to receive the overflow of divine knowledge, and to be a clear mirror for the reflection of divine truth. Rather than "horizontal" knowledge that becomes attenuated as it is transmitted from generation to generation, the Prophet gave cAli the key to the door of "vertical" knowledge, coming straight from its eternal source. The implicit but provocative aspect o f Sadra's commentary here is his suggestion that other human souls, perhaps all human souls, have the potential to acquire those same "keys" to vertical knowledge if they, like cAli, engage in the spiritual practices necessary to purify their own hearts and souls.
For those who succeed and thus reach the level of the awliya" and the true "People of the House," Sadra indicates that their degree of knowledge approximates, not only that of the Imams, but even that of the prophets themselves. He writes:
Thus the People o f the House (a.s.) are those firmly rooted in knowledge, and they possess the interpretation of the traditions. The people of the outward husk are distanced from true knowledge of the inner meanings of the Qur'an, and the interpretation (taWll) of traditions; since the husk can only know the husk, while the kernel (lubb) is only known to the possessors of understand ing (ulu l-albab) .114 They are those whose spirits have 113 Ibid., 319-320. 114 For a similar comparison between the people of the husk and the people of the "kernel" (ulu l-albab) as it relates to knowledge of the Qur'an in particular, see Asfar, 7:39-40.
been conveyed from the world o f form and sense to the world of spirit and intellect, for they acquire their knowledge from God through the light o f [spiritual] states, while others acquire their knowledge from men, whose method is but the collection of words. Know that the difference between the People of the House (a.s.)-that is, the perfected saints-and other learned men with regard to the inheritance from the Prophet (s.a.w.a.s.) is that the saint, protected against error (malsum min al-khata'), does not acquire that knowledge, which is the inheritance of the prophets and the messengers, until God inherits it from [the proph ets] and sends it to [the saint]. And as for other men, learned in written documents, they acquire knowledge transmitted from generation to generation . . . while the relation [to the initial source] becomes increasingly remote. As for the saints (a.s.), they acquire the inherit ance of the prophets (s.a.w.a.s.) from God, insofar as it is His inheritance and He gives it freely to them, for they are heirs to the messengers and the transmitters of their traditions, through something like the exalted and preserved authority that does not allow falsehood to enter into it from in front or from behind-a revelation (tanzil) from the Wise, the Praiseworthy.115 A number of extraordinary claims are put forth here. Sadra ascribes to this expanded group of "spiritual descendants," whom he here refers to as the "perfected saints" (awliyal), immunity from error ( isma) and a form of divine inspiration (tanzil) that is usually said to be the preserve of the prophets and the Imams. These two distinctions are directly related. Ordinary knowers receive knowledge by way of human transmission from one generation to the next. As the transmission becomes more remote from its initial source, it becomes increasingly attenuated and sometimes corrupted. The "perfected saints," however, acquire prophetic knowledge directly from God-who bequeaths it to the prophets, and takes it back upon their deaths, and then transmits it in pure, unadulterated form directly to the awliyaJ Sadra refers to this transmission of prophetic knowledge through the intermediary o f divine inheritance and bequest as a kind of tanzll-a remarkable statement, considering the nearly exclusive association of this term with historical prophecy, rather than with some form of inspiration (ilham).
While Sadra keeps the categories of prophet and wall nominally distinct, he elsewhere describes the nature of walaya in a manner that brings it very close to the status of prophethood. For example, Sadra describes the saintly knowers as "following a clear proof from their Lord" (cala bayyina min rabbihim),116 a phrase used repeatedly by the prophets in the Qur'an to assert the divine provenance of their missions.1 1 6 117 In one passage that occurs in Sadra's commentary on a hadlth found in Kulayni's chapter, Kitab al-hujja [The book of divine proof], he equates walaya with the lowest degree of prophethood, which is occupied by a prophet who receives a divine message in his own soul, perhaps through ilham, but is not required to convey that message beyond himself. Here Sadra adds:
. . . this is the degree of the awliya\ . . except that the title, wall, was not applied to any of the awliya' (a.s.) before the sending o f our Prophet M uhammad (s.a.w.a.s.); rather they were called "prophets" (anbiya1). For there is no difference between prophethood that does not bring with it a scriptural message (risala) or a divine law (tashrl), and walaya, except in name rather than meaning. Thus before the sending [of M uhammad], every wall was a prophet (nabl) in name.118 Sadra is not alone in defining walaya in such a way that it approximates the level o f prophethood, at least the level o f the non-lawgiving prophets before the time of Muhammad. Ghazali, for example, suggested that one can attain to the properties o f prophethood through the "fruitional experience" that some acquire by following "the way of Sufism" 119 Ruzbihan Baqli, in his Unveiling o f Secrets (Kashf al-asrar) asserts that God chose him for walaya, 120 but also recalls that when he was a young boy, he heard a voice that identified him as a prophet.121 And Ibn al-cArabi claimed to have reached a state of sanctity such that he became receptive to direct divine inspiration, reporting in his massive work, The Meccan Open ings (Futuhat al-Makkiyya) , that all the words that would follow had been "dictated" to him by God. 122 In fact, Sadras assimilation of the state of walaya with certain kinds of prophethood seems, in places, to have a strong Akbarian flavor. For example, in Sadras commentary on a hadlth in Kulayni's Kitab al-hujja, he presents a metaphorical image of the Prophet Muhammad as the center point of a necklace, with the pre-Islamic prophets who came before him ranged on one side, and the saints (awliya") who come after him ranged on the other. Each saint is posi tioned opposite a pre-Islamic prophet whom he resembles in some way. Sadra says that cAlI, the closest of the awliya' to Muhammad, faces Jesus, who is correspondingly the closest of the prophets to him, and notes that cAlI and Jesus resemble each other insofar as their spiritual stations were exaggerated by certain of their followers. 123 The conceptual relationship between the awliya' and the prophets suggested in this passage is highly similar to Ibn al-cArabi's discus sion of saints who take on the spiritual characteristics of various Islamic prophets.124 Sadra is not the first thinker to try to reconcile Twelver Shi i belief with an Akbarian conception of walaya; Haydar al-Amuli is known for doing the same. But by comparison, al-Amuli's formulation was more firmly wedded to Twelver Shi i imamology. For example, he accommodates the doctrine of the occultation of the Twelfth Imam in this discussion of sainthood by identifying him as the "seal of sainthood" (khatam al-awliya'), just as Muhammad was the seal of the prophets.125 Sadra does not show similar concern for such doctrinal matters. His conception of walaya and the spiritual position and characteristics of the awliyaf as he describes them, are more closely aligned with Sufi formulations of the term, and have a lesser, and at times almost nominal, connection to Twelver Shi i imamology.
Like the Sufi thinkers who influenced his thought, Sadra is aware of the hesitation and even repulsion with which ordinary people and "conventional" religious scholars viewed claims of divine inspiration outside the category of prophethood. Such a response would have to be expected, even from a metaphysical point of viewfor how can the lower grasp the higher, how can the limited know that which is free of those same limits? As he says above, those who receive their knowledge in this extraordinary way are "those whose spirits have been conveyed from the world of form and sense to the world of spirit and intellect" By virtue of the purification of their souls, they have acquired a form of prophetic knowledge through a divine conduit that has transformed their ontological state. Those who remain at a lower level of being-in the realm of sense and form-deny the existence of what transcends them:
. . . understanding the stages of walaya and prophecy are difficult [for those] at the stage of intellect the majority of people have reached. As it is the nature of common people to deny what they have not grasped, so it is also their nature to deny the state of walaya and its wonders, and the state of prophecy and its unique qualities. In fact, it is their nature to deny the next level of being and the life of the hereafter, which is the life of knowledge and of witnessing the angelic realm, because the ontologi cal levels of walaya and prophecy are also among the manifestations of authority in the hereafter, and whoever denies the reality o f the hereafter inevitably denies these two states. He does not recognize the prophet as a prophet, nor the wall as a wall.126 For Sadra, who viewed all of reality as a gradated continuum of being, the existence of the state of walaya between prophethood and ordinary humanity was a logical necessity. Sharp ontological distinctions made no sense within the logic o f this system, and so between the exalted stage of prophecy and the pitiful state of ordinary humanity, there had to be grades of closeness to the light of prophecy itself, and the movement upward through these grades of nearness and perfection was ontologically transformative. Not only should ordinary people not deny or begrudge the awliya' their ontological station, they should seek to reach it themselves through, in part, a humble obedience to these same perfected saints.127 Conclusion Sadra's commentary on Kulayni's Usul al-kafl is naturally assumed to be an exercise in reconciling his philosophy of knowledge and being with the transmitted sayings and doctrinal positions of the Twelver Shi i community to which he unambiguously belonged. Yet what we find in this commentary is a faithful presentation of the fluid, gradated, and hierarchal epistemology and ontology he expounds in his systematic, philosophical works. There is little evidence that Sadra tailors his views to accord with the ahadlth on which he comments. Knowledge is intimately connected to being, it is the ultimate purpose of all human activity and the vocation of all human life, it is the path to salvation and the very essence of life in the hereafter. It is the light that leads the soul on its journey through higher ontological levels and degrees of spiritual perfection in this world, and that guides it across the sirat in the next. This journey is powered by the soul's own effort, but initially requires the guidance of true teachers and knowers, who not only possess higher levels of knowledge, but who also occupy a higher ontological level, although among them there is a hierarchy as well. There are the worldly knowers whose "light" is like that of a lamp, emanating from earthly, not celestial, sources; they provide limited guidance, but are saved by their knowledge if their teaching and learning are sincere. Then there are the true knowers, whose knowledge is taken directly from the prophets and the saints (awliya'), and as such are like the moon, illumined by the light of the sun and transmitting it to those below them. And finally there are the prophets and the awliyff themselves, radiant by their own essence like the sun, with knowledge bequeathed to them directly by God. These categories are not fixed: Every learner, in the right company, with proper intention and effort, may become a true knower. Every true knower has, in principle, the potential to reach the level of the awliya\ occupied by the Imams but not exclusive to them-like the iron rod that moves ever closer to the fire, and eventually becomes like the fire itself. The category of prophethood is exclusive to the prophets, although the status of the awliyff approximates it in ways many might find controversial.
The hierarchical nature of Sadra's ontology, its close correlation with degrees o f knowledge, and its positing o f an intermediate spiritual level between the Prophet and the ordinary believer are all consistent with the Shfi religious perspective. But the lack of fixed ontological categories below the level of the Prophet, and Sadra's concomitant broadening of the category of the awliyff beyond the Imams-even if he maintains a certain privilege for them within this category-challenged more traditional conceptions o f the Imams' uniqueness. Moreover, Sadra's inclusive definition of the category of awliyti puts the Imams in the company, not of the exoteric Shfi religious scholars who claimed to be heirs to the knowledge and authority of the Imams, but of the saints and gnostics who in Sadra's description look far more like Sufi mystics than Shfi devo tees. The challenge to exoteric Shfi tradition that this represents is largely smoothed over throughout the commentary by Sadra's use of multivalent terms-wall, calim, carif, even imam-and the continual grounding of his spiritual hierarchy in the terminology of the Qur'an-ulu l-albab, rasikhuna f l l-ilm -terms used by Shfis and Sufis alike as Q uranic proof texts for their own conceptions of spiritual hierarchy. But his view of the highest form of knowledge (the knowledge of unveiling), and of the penultimate rung on the human ontological ladder (walaya), are recognizably Sufi rather than Shi i in orientation. Given his reported and repeated demonstra tions of reverence for the Imams, Sadra's commentary is not likely meant to undermine their position, but rather to demonstrate the way in which the teachings of the Imams, if read correctly, open onto an esoteric dimension missed by the majority of his scholarly contemporaries.
